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The Pastor as Bearer of Hopei
Donald Capps
Professor of Pastoral Care,
Princeton Theological Seminary
Karen Lebacqz’s and Ronald Barton’s book Sex in the
Parish emphasizes that pastors are professionals. (And be-
cause they are, they have power whether they know it or not.)
I want to continue this emphasis on the pastor as professional,
and to explore the idea that what makes the pastor unique
among professionals is that the pastor is fundamentally an
agent or bearer of hope. Other professionals offer and sup-
port hope, but they do this as a part or aspect of other things
they do. Pastors, I suggest, are bearers of hope by definition
(or calling), and often this is all that they are. A reason they
often feel vulnerable is the fact that they have nothing other
than hope to offer, and hope is a very intangible thing.
Pastors are intuitively aware that they are bearers of hope.
I support this intuition. However, I want to address the prob-
lem that while pastors know intuitively that they are bearers of
hope, and may have some clear ideas about what hope is the-
ologically understood, there isn’t much that pastors can read
about the experience of hope. What does it mean to hope?
What is the experience of hope about? And, more specifically,
what are the main elements or constituents of hope?
I will briefly comment on the developmental origins of hope,
then set forth a model of the experience of hoping and the char-
acteristics of hope, and then briefly discuss some new strategies
in psychotherapy that are supportive of hope, strategies that
pastors should find adaptable to the parish context. I have also
given thought to our need to identify the allies and adversaries
of hope, but space will not permit my going into that issue.
I should also note that the inspiration for this lecture came
from John Bunyan’s classic The Pilgrim^s Progress. Hopeful
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was the name of the companion who accompanied Christian,
the hero of the story, throughout most of his journey to the
promised land. When Christian was crossing the River Jor-
dan, his last testing before his entry into the Celestial City, he
began to sink and to cry out in despair. Hopeful was there to
encourage him, to hold his head above water until Christian
felt the solid ground beneath him. This is the image of the
pastor that I wish for us to reflect upon.
The Origins of Hope
Erik Erikson argues that hope is born in the earliest stage
of life—in infancy—and specifically in the infant’s relationship
with the mother or mothering one. Hope is thus born in the
experience of a reliable other who, as he says, provides “a con-
vincing pattern of providence” in which “hopes are met and
hopefulness is inherently rewarding”. 2 As the infant grows into
a child, hope becomes associated with the will and wdth the
capacity to take initiative^ so that the child becomes actively
involved in realizing hopes. With increased agency also comes
a greater capacity to renounce one’s hope, to “transfer disap-
pointed hopes to better prospects”, and to train our expec-
tations “on what promises to prove possible”. Hope remains
aligned with the maintenance of a stable, reliable and verifiable
world, but it becomes increasingly identified with change, new
prospects and widening horizons.
In infancy, hope is based on specific hopes and has not yet
developed into an attitude or spirit of hopefulness independent
of these specific hopes. But, in childhood, hopefulness becomes
inherently rewarding. Hence, even when some or many of our
hopes go unmet, when it would make sense for us to abandon
hope, fev\^ of us actually do. This is because we have become
hopeful selves, and hopefulness has become intrinsic to who we
are.
The Nature of Hope
Like those who write about love, those who have written
about hope have frequently commented on the difficulty of
defining or describing it. My own efforts to get at the phe-
nomenon of hope suggest the wisdom of making a distinction
between “hoping” and “hopes”. “Hoping” indicates that we
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are concerned with a process or form of experience, one that
may be compared with other experiences, like “loving”
,
“hat-
ing”, “creating” and the like. “Hope” or “hopes”, on the other
hand, concern a phenomenon or thing, one that may be com-
pared with other things, like “beliefs”, “judgments”, or “skills”.
Hoping
I suggest, as a working definition for hoping, that hoping
“is the perception that what one wants to happen will happen,
a perception that is fueled by desire and in response to felt
deprivation.”
1. The perception that what is wanted will happen. Alexan-
der Solzhenitsyn, the Russian author, was arrested by the KGB
in 1974 and forced into exile in the United States. Shortly af-
ter he came to the U.S. he told an interviewer, “I have no
proof of it; but I have a premonition, a feeling... I think—I am
sure—that I will return to Russia and still have a chance to live
there.” His intuition that he would someday return to Russia
was an indication of hoping. He had no “proof” for it, and
no specific plan for realizing it, and yet felt sure that it would
someday come to pass. As it turned out, his hoping proved to
be accurate.
I suggest that hoping is a particular kind or type of percep-
tion. It is the perception (or sense) that what is wanted will
happen, and it therefore involves investment of self: “I think
—
I am sure.” Without the sense that what we want to happen
will in fact happen, there is no hoping going on. Of course, our
confidence that what is wanted will happen can fluctuate over
time. There are times when we firmly believe that a given hope
will come true, and times when our confidence sags. Students
who anticipate a major exam often go through this up and
down cycle. One day, they are quite confident. The next day,
they are close to despair. The very fact that hoping produces
such fluctuating emotions tells us that emotions play a role in
hoping, but hoping is not primarily a matter of emotions. The
sense or intuition that what is wanted will happen can persist
even when we do not “feel” this to be the case. This disparity
between our current feelings and our longer range intuitions
suggests that hoping is primarily a perceptual phenomenon.
Emotions are involved, but hoping is primarily a way of seeing
or perceiving.
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2. Fueled hy Desire. Because we are created in the image of
God, we are desiring beings. We have longings and yearnings,
and these grow out of perceived lacks or needs. Hoping is fueled
by desire. We do not hope for what we already have. But
hoping is a persisting desire. It is more intense than wishing
but less intense than craving. Its intensity is expressed in its
persistence, as it continues to strive until its object is realized
or proven to be unrealizable. Cravings are more urgent but not
as lasting. If we crave a certain food and know that we should
not have it, we can sometimes talk ourselves into the notion
that the craving may pass. We are not as willing to dispense
with our desires. So too with wishes. We normally wish about
those matters whose outcome we are in no position to influence,
even by the simple act of entertaining the wish itself. But
when we hope, we not only anticipate that the object of our
desire will come about, but we also marshall our own energies
and resources to make it so. Wishes have little staying power,
little persistence, because they are not so invested with desire.
When a wish becomes invested with desire, it is then on its
way toward becoming a hope.
3. Response to felt deprivation. The third feature of hoping
is that it is a response to felt deprivation. Oftentimes, what
we lack is something that we have never had experience of, but
toward which we have a strong sense of wanting and needing.
We want the love we have never had, the recognition that we
have never been afforded, the joyful life that has never been
ours. Other times, what we lack is something we once had, but
have since been deprived of. We long for the presence of our
life’s companion, now deceased. We are fllled with nostalgia for
our childhood home. Our sense of deprivation may also involve
something we took for granted until we lost it: our health, our
work, our freedom to move about. One reason our hoping is
sometimes so difficult to identify or put our finger on is that the
lack we feel is deeply personal and difficult to put into words.
We sense that our lives are unfulfilled, or that our existence
seems purposeless and devoid of meaning. Or we have a deep
sense of personal inadequacy, of not having the capabilities we
want or need. How talk about something that we know only
by its absence?
Deprivations are not synonymous with loss, yet losses are
a major cause of a felt sense of deprivation and are therefore
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! of great importance to hoping. The hoping against hope that
i occurs in the wake of a loss reveals how deeply related hoping
i is to deprivation. Death takes from us the one with whom so
' many hopes, large and small, were shared. It also makes us
desperately aware of our deprivation. If we hope for our loved
1
one to be restored to us, we hope in vain, and we face the
i
stark and bitter truth that our deprivation cannot be erased
j|
however long we live. We learn instead that we must make do
j
with secondary hopes, with the compensatory hopes to which
we manage in time to orient our lives.
Hoping, then, is the perception that what is wanted will
happen, a perception fueled by desire and in response to felt
deprivation. Hoping involves all of these elements, and if any
one of them is missing, we are probably witnessing something
that approximates hoping but is something else (like wishing,
or pining, or anticipating). On the other hand, this under-
! standing of hoping reveals that it is not a rare thing at all. We
are all creatures of desire, and all of us feel deprived in one way




Yet, if this is so, why is it that we are so often despairing, so
i
often lacking in the perception that what is wanted will hap-
j
pen? One obvious answer is that we cannot always have what
I
we desire. Our desire is met by hard reality, and something has
I
to give, and what gives, more often than not, is hope. There
! is another reason, however, that is more subtle and less fre-
j
quently noted, and this is that we do not know what it is that
1
we desire. If it is difficult to put our finger on why we feel de-
!
prived and what we feel deprived of, it is also difficult to know
I
what it is that we really want. This brings us to the matter
' of our hopes: If hoping involves the perception that what is
i
wanted will happen, what is the “what” that is wanted? What
I
is the “object” of our desire?
I
Hopes
1 I suggest the following working definition for hopes: “Hopes
j




1. Hopes as projections. Because hoping is primarily a
: matter of sensing or perceiving, we should expect that hopes
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would express themselves in imagistic form and not as con-
cepts or ideas. If so, this invites us to consider hopes to be
projections. In psychology, a projection is the unconscious act
or process of ascribing to others one’s own ideas or intentions,
especially when such ideas or intentions are considered unde-
sirable. We may, for example, ascribe to another person sexual
fantasies or aggressive intentions that are really our own. In
photography, however, projection is the process of causing an
image to appear on a screen. In a sense, both types of projec-
tion are based on an illusion, and are therefore inherently false.
Yet, we generally view the photographic representation on the
screen as artistic, whereas the ascription of ideas or intentions
to another person is viewed as inappropriate, unacceptable and
often pathological. Paranoia, for example, involves the false
belief that someone wants to harm me.
One reason that we take a more positive view of the photo-
graphic over the psychological projection is that we understand
the photographic projection to be the work of a creative mind,
whereas psychological projection is the work of a mind that is
mistaken, disoriented or disturbed. The psychological projec-
tion is based on a fundamental error, the erroneous ascription
of ideas and intentions to another, and once we become aware
of the error, no useful purpose is served by retaining the pro-
jection. So we set about the task of learning how to withdraw
it, usually by putting something else—an accurate ascription
of the other’s intentions toward us—in its place. In photo-
graphic projection, the image has an artistic function not in
spite of but because of its illusory character. Such projections
continue to be valuable precisely because they are illusory, and
thus allow us to imagine a reality other than our own everyday
experience.
Hopes, then, are projections because they envision a future
that is technically false and unreal, as it does not exist, and
yet is profoundly true and real, as it expresses yearnings and
longings that not only exist but are often more real than the
objective world. When we hope, we envision eventualities that
are not yet realities but nevertheless appear to us as potential
realities. Also, because hope is a projection, and thus involves
images that play against the screen of the future, hope is a
certain way of seeing, of visualizing, of fore-seeing. We see or
image forth realities that are not yet present to us, and yet are
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jmade closer—almost within reach—by the images we project.
I In this sense, hopes are always a future projection, but through
I
imaging they make the future more palpably real and present
I
to us. Of course, the flip side of this is that our capacity to
I
project a future can also cause us to despair. As Yogi Berra,
i
catcher and manager for the New York Yankees, is reputed to
!
have said, “The future ain’t what it used to be.”
I
Our images of hope are also 5e//-projections. By hoping,
we project ourselves into the future and envision our existence
being different from what it is at present. The fact that hoping
involves self-projections has inspired some psychotherapists to
!
focus on their counselees’ current self-images and their images
I
of themselves as future-projection (what do you see yourself
being in the near and more distant future?). By helping their
counselees identify these two self-images, present and future,
therapists enable them to find ways to close the gap that sep-
arates them, usually by assisting them in realizing the future
self, enabling it to become more real, more “present”, to the
counselee. So, when we image the future, envision the not-yet,
we place ourselves in this scene, for, after all, it is not some
abstract or impersonal future that we are projecting and en-
visioning; it is our future, and thus our own involvement in
the image can always be assumed. Even when we envision a
future in which we are physically absent, as when we imagine
I a scene in which our families have gathered to mourn our own
death, we have projected ourselves into this future, as we have
envisioned ourselves as deceased and as witnessing the scene
that stretches out before us.
Because the future is unpredictable and has its own real-
ity, our hopeful projections rarely fit the future with perfect
accuracy. This does not mean, however, that such projections
should be discouraged or suppressed for, as Erik Erikson has
argued, hope is often the decisive element in changing the world
of facts. He writes: “Hope not only maintains itself in the face
of changed facts—it proves itself able to change facts, even
as faith is said to move mountains.” ^ We should also keep in
mind that change is inevitable. The future will not be the
same as the present, even as the present is not the same as the
past. Basing itself on this known fact, hope chooses to antici-
pate the nature of the changes that may occur. It knows that
such anticipations are risky and subject to error. Yet, future
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projections are in fact realities, as they have impact on the
current state of affairs. This is one reason why the capacity
to hope was so vitally important to the prisoners in concentra-
tion camps during World War II. By projecting a future, hope
alters the present. Physically, the prisoners were captives, but
inwardly they achieved a margin of freedom to the extent that
they were able to hope. To project hopes is to achieve some
degree of autonomy in the present, and, by autonomy, Erikson
means self-government rather than government by others. The
margin of freedom that such projections effect may be slight,
but it can be the difference between life and death.
2. Hopes as envisionings of the realizable. If hoping involves
the perception that what is wanted will happen, it follows that
our projected hopes will be envisionings of what is realizable.
Hopes are not projections of what we believe to be impossibil-
ities, as the very projection of impossibilities would not make
for hope but for hopelessness, and would therefore be grounds
for despair. When we hope, we anticipate the realization of
what is projected.
If so, this does not mean that hope only envisions realistic
possibilities. To say that hope envisions the realizable does
not mean that it is bound by the practical, the sensible, the
proven, or the tried and true. In many situations, we have
no way of knowing on the basis of prior experience what is or
is not realizable. Sometimes, we realize more than previous
experience would have indicated is possible. In other cases,
we realize much less. So, hopes are not based on calculations
of what is realistic on the basis of prior experience. Instead,
they are based on the view that the future is open, and that
the future is to some degree amenable to our efforts to make a
difference.
When we tell someone to be realistic, we often plunge a knife
into hope itself, as such admonitions often create a spirit of
quiet despair. Parents often tell their children to be realistic
—
about themselves, about their abilities and capacities, about
their future prospects. Pastors often tell young couples who are
about to be married to be realistic—about the problems they
will inevitably face, about the dangers of relying on romantic
love to see them through the crises of married life, and about
the misplaced trust in marriage to effect change in their per-











and young couples need such admonitions, and, no doubt, par-
ents and pastors are qualified to offer them. Yet the adoption
of a realistic approach can erode a hopeful approach to life, as
it may cause us to settle for a less full and vital life than would
I
in fact be accessible to us. As already noted, hopes change the
world of facts. They enable our children to accomplish more
than we ever thought possible, and they enable young couples
to experience marriages that may in fact be far happier than
those of the adults who are cautioning them not to expect more
from marriage than they can realistically hope to experience.
There are always more possibilities than a realistic assess-
ment of our situation recognizes or acknowledges. The question
then becomes, not “What is realistic to hope for?” but “What
is possible for meT^ One reason we resent admonitions to be
“realistic” is that we suspect that they are not based on in-
“ timate knowledge of ourselves, but instead on a knowledge of
humanity in general, or some group or category of humans with
whom we are being identified on the basis of age, gender, race
or cultural background. We feel that if the other persons really
knew us, in our own unique individuality, they would not be
voicing these admonitions, or would at least express them very
differently.
The question “What is possible for meT^ points instead
j to the role of self-knowledge in the formulation and realization
( of hopes. Based on what we know about ourselves, we may
anticipate that certain things are possible for us and others are
not. We weigh the possibilities that are in front of us in light of
our understanding of ourselves, our temperament, our traits,
our motivations, our values. What we envision to be realizable
is thus profoundly infiuenced by what we understand ourselves
to be.
We know, of course, that the realization of certain possibil-
ities does not depend entirely on us. But we also know that
who we are has a powerful infiuence on what we can anticipate
in the future. If we envision ourselves becoming medical doc-
tors some day, but also know that we do not have the personal
motivation to endure years of medical training, or that we hate
science or cannot stand the sight of blood, it should become
clear to us, sooner or later, that the hope of becoming a medi-
cal doctor is not a real possibility for us. On the other hand, if
we know that we do have the motivation to endure prolonged
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medical training, and that we love science and do not hate the
sight of blood, the hope of becoming a medical doctor is a real
possibility for us. It is not a certainty, as there are many fac-
tors besides these that could affect the outcome, some of which
are entirely outside of our control. (Keats discovered while in
medical training that he was incurably ill; which is why he be-
came a poet instead, and died in his early twenties.) But, with
hope, the issue is not certainty but possibility, and genuine
hope is based on what is possible for us. The point is not that
we should be realistic about our changes for realizing this or
that, but that we should make an effort to know ourselves and
to entertain those hopes that are not contradicted by what we
learn.
3. Hopes Involve Risk. Because they involve desires that
may or may not be realized, hopes are inherently risky. It is all
too easy to idealize hopes, to declare that they are inherently
good as they manifest a positive attitude toward the future.
Yet, because the future is open, there is always the risk that
our hopes will not be realized. Disappointment, demoraliza-
tion, even feelings of devastation may follow. Given the risks
involved, we sometimes keep our hopes to ourselves, so that if
they do not materialize, we will not have the added humiliation
of public failure. However, concealing hopes from others does
not work because our hopes are revealed more by the way we
live our lives than by what we say. A couple who have been
dating for several months do not have to tell us in words that
certain hopes are associated with this relationship. If, in time,
we no longer see them together, we know without being told
that certain hopes have not been fulfilled.
To hope, then, is to place ourselves at risk. We risk the
failure of our hopes and the shame and humiliation that often
accompany the failure of hopes. When our hopes fail, we take it
very personally because in hoping we invest ourselves, putting
our very existence on the line.
If one risk of hopes is that they set us up for possible failure,
another danger is that they may direct us to unworthy goals or
cause us to overlook other objectives that are more desirable.
We can become captive to certain hopes precisely because we
judge them to be more realizable than others. Some hopes
are realizable but the price is too high. One may become the
top salesperson in the firm—a long desired goal—but find that
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the price in terms of shattered personal relationships, weak-
ened personal integrity and broken personal health was far too
high. Or one finds that the achievement of professional success
does not bring the anticipated personal satisfaction or finan-
cial security. There are also instances when the realization of
some cherished hope leaves us confused or apathetic, as we
no longer have the goal that previously energized us. Unful-
filled hopes cause despair, but fulfilled hopes often cause de-
pression, apathy and boredom. People who discern that they
are especially prone to such reactions in the wake of hope’s
fulfillment
—
people with self-knowledge—will often entertain
more than one hope, or hopes that build on one another, so
that when one hope is realized they have already oriented their
lives toward another. As Erikson puts it, “It is in the nature
of our maturation that concrete hopes will, at a time when
a hoped-for event or state comes to pass, prove to have been
quietly superseded by a more advanced set of hopes.” ^
Another risk that hopes present is that we become so ori-
ented toward their attainment that we neglect the satisfactions
our present situation already affords. This is often used as an
argument for curbing our desires and for being content with
what we have. But a more useful perspective is to realize that
our current situation is, in part, the fruit of various past hopes
that have been fulfilled, and we should not therefore neglect
their continuing meaning for us. We may need a hope-beyond-
hope to sustain us through the period of depression or apathy
that follows the realization of a given desire, but there are also
times when our envisioning of still another hope causes us to
overlook the satisfactions that previously realized desires af-
ford.
Hope has a restless quality to it. By definition, it is oriented
to the future. It should not be curbed or stified, but it is not
everything, and sometimes it needs to be balanced by other
perceptions and experiences. When we experience satisfaction
in our present reality, we allow love an equally significant place
in our lives. Where hope is always oriented to the realizable,
love is appreciation for what we already have. So a discerning
life—a life of wisdom—is based on our capacity to balance our
hopes and our loves, and not to allow our lives to be dominated
by one or the other.
Still another risk in hopes is their consequences for others.
There are times when our hopes, if realized, will make life more
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difficult for others, especially those who are dependent on us.
Knowing that our hopes may carry risks for others, we may
decide they are not worth the price that others may have to
pay for them, and we resign ourselves to their unfulfillment.
We may continue to harbor resentments against those who in-
hibited the realization of these hopes. Some people carry such
resentments to their graves: “If only Jim had been more coura-
geous and less practical.” “If only I had trusted my own judg-
ment instead of listening to Liz, with all her objections and
‘what ifs’.” In turn, children of parents who sacrificed their
own hopes for “the sake of the children” may carry through
life the sense that they were the unwitting cause of a parent’s
disappointment, or were made the scapegoat for a parent’s in-
ability to take the necessary personal risks involved.
Thus, as future projections that envision the realizable,
hopes are risky, and are typically experienced as such. Hopes
can be exciting, scary or unnerving. Unlike reveries, musings
and day dreamings, hopes anticipate real changes, and because
they do, we should not romanticize hope as though it were an
utterly harmless activity. Hopes can have tremendously posi-
tive outcomes, but they are also responsible for harm. One test
of our maturity as persons is our ability to hope in ways that do
not put other individuals at unacceptable levels of risk. Other
tests of our maturity are the willingness to accept higher levels
of risk for ourselves than will be required of others, and our
ability to make intentional, self-conscious efforts to minimize
the costs of our hopes to others.
Hope and the Reframing of Time
I want now to comment briefly on methods that are cur-
rently in use in psychotherapy that encourage hopefulness for
the future. These methods fit within the category of reframing
methods, which I discussed at some length in my book enti-
tled Reframing: A New Method in Pastoral CareA The two
methods that have particular bearing on my discussion here
are presented in a book by two Finnish psychotherapists, Ben
Furman and Tapani Ahola, entitled Solution TalkA The one




In “future visioning” the counselees are asked to project
themselves into the future (several weeks, six months, a year
from now) and to describe their life now that their problem
has been resolved, and to explain what they believe made the
change possible. The method of “future visioning” is revealing
for what it precludes. By focusing on a time in the future when
the problem has been “overcome” rather than upon the past
where the problem is assumed to have originated, the persons
involved in the situation can be seen as mutual helpers rather
than as obstacles. They are not the objects of blame, as usually
occurs when the therapy focusses on underlying causes of the
current problem. Also, the counselees’ own narrative of how
the problem got resolved is potentially as worthy of a plan for
its resolution as anything the therapist might have proposed.
The therapist may simply give the plan his or her blessing.
For example, one of the authors was a consultant to a mental
health facility. The health team met with a teenage boy whose
treatment wasn’t going well. When he was asked to envision
himself six months from now—doing much better—and to ex-
plain how these positive results came about, he mentioned that
a particular staff psychiatrist had befriended him and helped
him get better. This was not, however, the psychiatrist who
had been assigned to this boy; it was one he watched work-
ing with other patients. So on the basis of the boy’s future
visioning this psychiatrist was assigned to him, and he began
to show improvement immediately.
Theologically informed readers of Furman’s and Ahola’s
book are often quick to note that what underlies their future
visioning method is a kind of realized eschatology. The future
is already here, in the present, so that what we have been hop-
ing for—our heartfelt desires—are already being met. What
their cases show is that clients are quite willing to engage in
the imaginative act of future visioning, and that, when they
do so, they have a lively perception of having made the future
present.
Revising the Past
The other method that involves a reframing of time for the
sake of a more hopeful future is Furman’s and Ahola’s notion
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of “revising the past”. They note that we tend to view our
past as the source of our problems, and argue that as long as
we view it this way we set up an adversarial relationship with
ourselves because our history is an integral part of us. This
adversarial relationship with ourselves can be reduced, if not
overcome completely, by viewing our past as “a resource, a
store of memories, good and bad, and a source of wisdom em-
anating from life experience”. The past is no longer viewed as
“the source of our problems” but is seen instead as “resource
for solutions”. The authors relate how they encourage their
counselees to see past events that they have interpreted as lia-
bilities as being, rather, sources of strength. They tell about a
woman whose mother put her in a dark closet for hours when
she was a child. This woman had gone on to become a gifted
art teacher, helping children use their imaginations through
drawing. When she related how her mother had confined her
to a dark closet for hours, the counselor (one of the authors
of the book) did not minimize the trauma she had suffered,
namely, that she was the victim of child abuse. But he asked
her the question: “What did you do in the closet to keep your-
self from going crazy with fear?” She answered, “I used my
imagination. I thought of myself being somewhere else, out in
the fields, or in a park.” Then he said, “And isn’t this what
you are now doing for the children you teach? Isn’t your expe-
rience of coping with being locked in a closet as a child a source
of your gift as a teacher?” She had not made this connection
in her mind before this.
This method of “revising the past” is designed to change
a person’s perception of what is possible for him or her as far
as the future is concerned, this change being made possible by
changing the meaning of certain past events. This method is
also based on the rather odd assumption that the past is as
open and as possibility-filled as the future is. To say this is to
seem to speak utter nonsense, for only a fool believes that the
past can be other than what it was. Yet there is also wisdom
—
a kind of foolish wisdom—in this affirmation of the openness
and revisability of the past, for it says that what is open about
the past is the meaning or significance we assign to it in the
present. In support of this view, we have the biblical Joseph’s
contention that the turning of his brothers’ act of treachery
into something providential was an act of God. This means
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that “revising the past” may also be theologically understood
as being grounded in the boundless mercy of God, who is able
to take sinful actions that we or others committed in the past
and make of them something better than we would ever have
imagined.
Which is to say that God is the original and eternally Hope-
ful Self, who uses the agency that is God’s own to keep the
future ever open for new possibilities. That the world and we
ourselves exist at all is because it is God’s nature to be hopeful.
We exist because God, in response to God’s own felt depriva-
tion, was fueled by desire, and perceived that something new
could come into being. As James Weldon Johnson, author
of the poem “The Creation” puts it, “And God walked out
on space and said, T’m lonely. I’ll make me a world.’ This
world that God made is a 5 e//-projection, a world into which
God, from the very beginning until now and forever after, has
projected God’s very own self.
But this was a self-projection that carried great risk for
God, as hopes, once realized, take on a life of their own, having
effects that were not originally intended. Hopes are wonderful
things, but they are also dangerous, a fact to which the world,
and especially the history of humankind, is tragic testimony.
This is why it is so essential for us to believe that God remains
a Reliable Other who has not abandoned us, and why it is
important that some of us be pastors, ones who assist others
in their struggles to maintain hope—helping them keep their
heads above water—and who testify to, and carry in their very
being, the ambiguities that are inherent in hope itself.
Notes
1 Delivered as one of the annual Lutheran Life Lectures at Waterloo
Lutheran Seminary, 4 November 1993.
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